An unexpected contact on the professional network. An offer of work from a headhunter, most likely a female agent, based in China. The chance to make perhaps £20,000 part-time writing a handful of political reports for a firm from China peppered with confidential or “insider” insights. Payment in cryptocurrency or physical money preferred.
It might appear clear, on this telling, that something about this method would be suspicious. Nevertheless, China’s powerful Ministry of State Security still considers it worthwhile to deploy recruitment consultants to attempt this – leading the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their activity online.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were approaching Britons on LinkedIn on an extraordinary scale, at a rate of 10,000 over the preceding two and a half years, seeking governmental, commercial, military and scientific classified information. But a new campaign aimed at politicians and Westminster has led the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage warning was issued on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords counterpart: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to contact Members of Parliament, peers, their staffers, economists, research organizations – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Strategy and Legal Updates
In the typical style of UK security services, there was no official release of the security advice from the agency or the Home Office. Yet the agency knew its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the press helps the wider public better identify communications with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the effect of uncovering more information from in and around parliament, although that is not the agency's main objective. The agency aims for people in public life to recognize that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Additionally, the internal security service believed to have been reacting to any specific incident in the legislature, although the burst of activity occur after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide an individual and his friend another person on a technicality in recent months.
The two had been charged of working for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but inability to complete a prosecution under the since replaced Official Secrets Act led to concerns that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Updated Laws and China's Long-Term Interests
The law has since been updated, and the MI5 slide includes a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in spying operations risk substantial criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” It is a crime if a person engages in behavior that is or is likely to “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, though, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is not a government minister will have restricted access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. Yet Beijing is also interested in parliament: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Methodological Variations and Ongoing Cyber Risks
To a degree there are cultural differences too. Autocratic regimes like China’s utilize intelligence collection methods and the size of its spy network is vast, engaging three hundred thousand individuals. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, commented it was sometimes estimated that “China have greater linguistic capacity involved in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is prepared to cultivate contacts over the extended period and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and spying. “China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value,” the minister responsible a government official told parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may result in someone quickly marginal turning important.
Another way to consider the relentless efforts at secret intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the Western nations at a level under the level of outright war. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is engaged in persistent attempts to find secret informants on UK politics via digital means because it wants to be provocative, to demonstrate power and because it has the capability.